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Introduction 
Funding the budget to cover the cost of replacing 
Britain’s current Trident submarines was always 
going to be a contentious issue for the British 
government as it approached the ’Main Gate’ stage 
in the Successor programme, the point at which 
contracts for constructing the new submarines will 
be in place and annual costs would increase 
dramatically. It is projected to be easily the most 
expensive defence procurement project for the 
decade from 2015/6, sucking the finances out of 
other major projects. Assurances made in 2006/7 
by the previous government that the replacement 
programme would not impact upon conventional 
capabilities were always likely to prove unrealistic, 
even before the recession and the subsequent 
decision to slash public spending. The 
announcement on July 29 by Chancellor George 
Osborne that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) will 
have to fund the capital costs of replacing the 
current Trident system from its own core budget 
rather than have it provided through the Treasury 
reserve has forced MoD to face the reality of the 
costs of replacement, and has reignited a public 
debate about whether the country needs and can 
afford a like-for-like replacement of the current 
system.  
Musical chairs: who holds the budget? 
The cost of procuring nuclear weapon systems has 
in the past come from the MoD budget following 
negotiations with the Treasury to supplement the 
budget to partially offset the additional cost. When 
decisions were made to procure the current 
system in 1982, for example, Defence Secretary 
John Nott stated that “I have not been given any 
extra money for Trident. I have negotiated a 3 per 
cent real growth up until 1985/86”.1 In 2006 Prime 
Minister Tony Blair stated explicitly that the 
Trident replacement programme would “not be at 
the expense of the conventional capabilities that 
our armed forces need”.2 The cost of initial 
development work on the Successor programme 
for the period 2007-08 to 2010-11 was explicitly 
reflected in the 2007 Comprehensive Spending 
Review budget settlement, but came from the 
MoD budget. In line with the Conservative 
government’s approach in 1982, the Review stated 
that it was increasing the MoD budget by “1.5 per 
cent average annual real growth over the three 
years to 2010-11. This increase in funding, together 
with value for money reforms generating annual 
net cash-releasing savings of £2.7 billion by 2010-
11, enables the MoD to... fund the renewal of 
Britain’s nuclear deterrent while ensuring that this 
does not come at the expense of the conventional 
capability our Armed Forces need...” 3 If specific 
allocations to Trident and improving armed forces 
accommodation are excluded from the budget 
settlement, the MoD actually suffered a reduced 
budget in real terms. Expenditure on the Successor 
                                                          
1
 Strategic Nuclear Weapons Policy, House of Commons 
Defence Committee, HC 266 (London: HMSO, March 
1982), para. 70.  
2
 House of Commons, Official Report, December 4, 2006, 
Column 23. 
3
 Pre-Budget Report and Comprehensive Spending 
Review, CM 7227 (London: HMOS, October 2007), p. 
231. 
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programme has amounted to £1 billion over this 
period.4 
This time the Trident programme cannot be 
supported by an increase in the defence budget 
since the budgets of those major departments that 
have not been protected from cuts (this includes 
MoD) are set to reduce in real terms by 20% over 
the course of the current parliament.5 Of course it 
is still possible that MoD through special pleading 
will have a smaller budget cut than it would 
otherwise have received, though this would likely 
attract significant opposition from Treasury and 
other ministers as it would require other 
departments to accept higher cuts.  
A choice between cuts to conventional 
programmes and a review? 
Perhaps more significantly, it would be much 
harder to claim that conventional capabilities were 
not suffering when the overall defence budget was 
experiencing cut-backs and having to cover the 
                                                          
4
 200 million in 2008-09, £400 million in 2009-10, and 
£400 million in 2010-11, Response by Bob Ainsworth, 
Minister of State for the Armed Forces, to a written 
question. House of Commons, Official Report, October 
9, 2007, Column 505W;
 
House of Commons, Official 
Report, April 28, 2009, Column 1160W; The United 
Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent Capability, National 
Audit Office, p. 18. 
5
 Osborne declared in his budget statement in June 2010 
that “We have inherited from the previous Government 
spending plans to cut departmental budgets by £44 
billion a year by 2014-15. This implies an average real 
reduction for unprotected departments of 20 per 
cent…Because the structural deficit is worse than we 
were told, my Budget today implies further reductions 
in departmental spending of £17 billion by 2014-15.” 
Budget statement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
the Rt Hon George Osborne MP, June 22, 2010. 
Available at <http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/junebudget_speech.htm>. 
costs of the Successor programme; this at a time 
when the defence procurement budget is set to 
experience a bow-wave of major procurement 
commitments over the coming decade. The 
National Audit Office reported in 2009 that, “if the 
Defence budget remained constant in real terms, 
and using the Department’s forecast for defence 
inflation of 2.7 per cent, the gap [between 
estimated funding and the cost of the Defence 
budget] would now be £6 billion over the ten 
years. If, as is possible given the general economic 
position, there was no increase in the defence 
budget in cash terms over the same ten year 
period, the gap would rise to £36 billion”.6 
The announcement by Osborne suggests a number 
of possible conclusions: 
1) The Coalition leadership may not place as 
rigid a priority on retaining the current 
plans for like-for-like replacement as 
previously thought. MoD could therefore 
be forced both to explore a much cheaper 
alternative and to extend the life of the 
current Trident system. 
2) The original commitment from 2006 that 
Trident replacement will not affect 
conventional capabilities cannot be 
realised. MoD will have to weigh up the 
relative priorities of different military 
capabilities vis-à-vis the options around a 
continuing nuclear capability – underlining 
the need to include Trident replacement in 
the Strategic Defence and Security Review. 
3) A further delay in the Initial Gate decision 
on building the Successor submarines 
                                                          
6
 Ministry of Defence: The Major Projects Report 2009, 
National Audit Office, HC 85-1 (London: HMSO, 
December 2009), p. 4. 
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originally scheduled for September 2009 
can be expected. 
4) We can expect either further rhetoric on 
the essential importance and wide-ranging 
utility of Trident to justify the expense and 
opportunity cost of proceeding with a like-
for-like replacement; or the emergence of 
a new rhetoric that highlights changed 
circumstances and limits utility to current 
and prospective nuclear-armed ‘rogue’ 
states to justify a smaller nuclear force 
leading to significant change in declaratory 
policy and nuclear targeting plans and 
assumptions. 
5) The government may also decide to scale 
back the expensive recapitalisation 
programme at the Atomic Weapons 
Establishment (AWE) Aldermaston. 
Costs of the system 
MoD’s current budget is approximately £38.5 
billion, when reported under the government’s 
standard accounting policy called ‘resource 
accounting and budgeting’ or RAB.7 A 10-20% cut 
over the 4-5 years of the current parliament will 
require £3.8-7.6 billion in savings against current 
spending plans. The in-service ‘cash’ costs of 
operating the United Kingdom’s current Trident 
system, including the associated costs of running 
AWE Aldermaston, consumes around 5-6% of the 
‘near cash’ budget figure, which in 2007/8 was 
                                                          
7
 RAB is an accruals basis of accounting that attempts to 
include notional figures for the use of non-financial 
resources, such as crown land. It is NOT the same as the 
actual cash spend by the department. The RAB figure for 
MoD does not include costs of war pensions and 
benefits and military operations and peacekeeping 
missions, which takes the total to £42 billion. 
£29.4 billion.8 This gives a range of £1.5-£1.8 billion 
split almost 50:50 between the annual capital and 
running costs for AWE Aldermaston and the annual 
capital and running costs for the four-boat 
Vanguard fleet and Trident missiles.9 The 2006 
White Paper assumed that the new system would 
have similar features.10  
MoD currently has a special investment 
programme operating at AWE Aldermaston to 
ensure continued support to the Trident warhead 
and to build a replacement if needed, called the 
Nuclear Weapons Capability Sustainment (or 
Warhead Assurance) Programme. Spending on this 
rose from £350 million per year between 2006/7 
and 2008/9 to £1 billion per year between 2009/10 
and 2012/3.11 It is almost certain that these 
recapitalisation costs are excluded from the annual 
AWE capital and running costs. If so, then the cost 
of maintaining the current nuclear capability and 
investment in AWE is already approaching £3 
billion per year. Even if current levels of capital 
investment in AWE fall by half, total costs will 
remain around £2.5 billion. 
To this we can add the annual costs of the ten-year 
partnering contract between MoD and Rolls Royce 
signed in May 2007 to fund development of a new 
                                                          
8
 See: 
<www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/Organis
ation/KeyFactsAboutDefence/DefenceSpending.htm>. 
MOD says it refers to near cash budget in MOD 
supplementary memorandum to The Future of the UK’s 
Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the White Paper, House of 
Commons Defence Committee HC 22 (London: HMSO, 
2007), Ev 206.  
9
 House of Commons, Official Report, January 31, 2008, 
Column 526W. 
10
 House of Commons, Official Report, December 3, 
2007, Column 845W. 
11
 House of Commons, Official Report, March 11, 2005, 
Column 1257W; & September 9, 2009, Column 136WS. 
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nuclear reactor plant for the Successor submarine 
fleet worth up to £1 billion;12 plus the cost of the 
existing programme to extend the life of the 
current Vanguard submarines that will cost at least 
hundreds of millions of pounds.13  
The capital cost of the Trident replacement 
programme over the next 10-15 years (not 
including running costs) is likely to be between £15 
and £28 billion.14 The government has stated that 
most of the expenditure will occur over the period 
2015-2025. An optimistic total based on the lower 
end of the government’s estimates provided in its 
2006 White Paper on Trident replacement is £15 
billion: £11 billion for four new submarines; £2 
billion for a new warhead; and £2 billion for 
infrastructure. A more realistic figure based on the 
original cost of building the current four Vanguard 
submarines plus 3% defence inflation,15 together 
with the higher end of the government’s figures is 
£28 billion: £22 billion for four new submarines; £3 
billion for a new warhead; and £3 billion for 
infrastructure.  
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 House of Commons, Official Report, July 25, 2007, 
Column WS89; The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear 
Deterrent Capability, p. 15. 
13
 The Future of the UK’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the 
White Paper, House of Commons Defence Committee 
HC 22, (London: HMSO, 2007), p. Ev 59. 
14
 In 2010 values. The figures in this briefing generally 
quote such expenditures in 2010 values. 
15
 See Malcolm Chalmers, “The Myth of Defence 
Inflation”, RUSI Defence Systems, June 2009, pp. 12-16, 
and Nick Ritchie, Continuity/Change: Rethinking Options 
for Trident Replacement, University of Bradford, June 
2010. 
Capital spending programme (£bn) 
 
Lower end Upper end 
Submarines £11 £22 
Infrastructure £2 £3 
Warheads £2 £3 
Total £15 £28 
 
In November 2008 MoD’s Permanent 
Undersecretary Sir Bill Jeffrey warned that the 
government’s 2006 figures were only “ballpark 
estimates”.16 They are likely to go up. MoD is due 
to provide an updated view of overall costs in the 
Autumn in order to inform the Initial Gate Business 
Case for the Successor programme. Its cost 
modelling work has continued over 2010 in parallel 
with the Value for Money Review.17 
Figure 1 shows the spread of total capital 
expenditure on the initial Trident programme, 
including submarines, warheads, missiles and 
infrastructure, based on figures provided to the 
House of Commons Defence Committee by MoD 
and parliamentary questions over the course of the 
programme. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16
 Uncorrected transcript of oral evidence to the 
Committee of Public Accounts hearing on The United 
Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent Capability, 
November 19, 2008. 
17
 Ministry of Defence, Consolidated Departmental 
Resource Accounts 2009-10, HC 258 (London: HMSO, 
July 2010), p. 129. 
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Figure 1: Annual percentage of total Trident programme 
expenditure, 1983-2002 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the annual cost of planned 
capital spending on new submarines, warheads 
and infrastructure based on a £15 billion (blue) and 
£28 billion (red line) programme over the next 
twenty years using the same spread of expenditure 
and assuming significant expenditure begins with 
an Initial Gate decision in 2010. 
Figure 2: Illustrative annual capital expenditure on the 
explicit Trident replacement programme, 2010-2027 
 
On this illustrative projection, MoD faces an 
average capital cost for the Successor programme 
after Main Gate between 2016 to 2023 of £1.4-
£2.6 billion/year based upon extrapolating the 
spread of expenditure of the original Trident 
programme. 18 In a worst-case scenario for MoD, if 
its current budget is cut in real terms by 20% over 
the next 4-5 years of this parliament, running costs 
and AWE recapitalisation remain the same at £3 
billion/year and Trident replacement costs average 
£2.6 billion/year, then MoD could be spending £5.6 
billion of the £26.9 billion budget,19 or over 20% of 
the overall defence budget on its nuclear 
capability over the eight years from main gate. 
On an optimistic set of figures, a defence budget 
cut of 10%, average Trident replacement costs of 
£1.5 billion/year, and running costs and AWE 
recapitalisation of £2.5 billion/year mean MoD will 
be spending £3.5 billion of a £30.3 billion budget, 
or almost 12% of the defence budget per year. 
Can the costs be carried? 
If the government judges that retaining a 
sophisticated nuclear capability at current levels is 
essential to UK security, it could justify spending on 
this level, albeit unprecedented since the end of 
the Cold War. Advocates of such a judgement insist 
that decisions on the country’s nuclear future be 
based upon the need for a high strategic capability 
to counter possible security threats to the survival 
of the nation in an uncertain future, even if the 
probability of such threats is low. Others believe 
that such a position runs counter to the 
government’s policy of promoting global nuclear 
                                                          
18
 Figures are quoted in (real) 2010 values, and in any 
case are by their nature estimates. Actual cash values 
are likely to be higher with inflation. This does not affect 
the proportional estimate that concludes the paragraph. 
19
 Eighty percent of the £33,628 current (2010/11)‘near 
cash’ defence budget, published by MoD at 
<http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/
Organisation/KeyFactsAboutDefence/DefenceSpending.
htm>. 
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disarmament and non-proliferation. Even if the 
government deems it too early to make a 
commitment to complete disarmament by default, 
there are other options that could preserve a 
nuclear option at lower capability.  
George Osborne’s announcement indicates 
Treasury’s desire to ensure MoD takes full 
responsibility to control costs, and possibly to scale 
back ambitions for the planned Successor system. 
The nuclear capability will now be judged squarely 
against other military capabilities, both for its 
strategic necessity and value-for-money. To the 
undoubted displeasure of nuclear advocates, MoD 
must now ask itself not what sort of ‘Rolls Royce’ 
nuclear weapon system could provide a ‘minimum 
deterrent’ in all possible scenarios however 
unlikely they may be, but rather how much it can 
afford to spend, what capability options that could 
provide, and how that affects understandings of UK 
nuclear deterrent posture. In short, spending on 
the nuclear deterrent has to be weighed up directly 
against other essential defence spending.  
However, any decision to scale back or abandon its 
nuclear capability transparently on the grounds of 
cost alone would represent a gross missed 
opportunity to engage internationally in nuclear 
diplomacy. It would simply send the signal that 
Britain could no longer afford to remain within the 
nuclear club, leaving membership open to others 
with the resources and determination to stay the 
course at whatever political, economic and social 
cost. With a positive international diplomatic 
context in which the desire to move quickly 
towards a world free of nuclear weapons has 
gathered global political support, public spending 
budgets under severe, continuing high profile and 
expensive defence commitments elsewhere, and 
the Successor project still very much in its early 
stages, now is the ideal time to take a step back 
and reassess the options on the basis of strategic 
and budgetary need and the international context.  
Cover photo: HMS Vanguard (SSBN-50) accompanied by 
civilian tugboats, U.S. Department of Defense, OS2 John 
Bouvia. 
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